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The first successful free and fair elections, held in October 2011, for the Constituent Assembly and the formation soon after of a 
three-party ruling coalition1 seem to have 
set Tunisia squarely on the path towards 
democratization. Since then, very little 
attention has been paid to the country 
that kicked off the Arab Spring. Tunisian 
events have faded into the background of 
current affairs for two reasons. First, the 
focus has shifted to the fate of countries 
with greater geostrategic importance, such 
as Egypt, and with the potential of setting 
off a regional conflagration, such as Syria. 
Second, according to some scholars,2 
Tunisia has already succeeded in its transi-
tion to democracy, although it has yet to 
consolidate its new institutions; therefore, 
not much can go wrong at this stage. Both 
reasons are valid to the extent that Tunisia 
is not a prominent regional actor and that 
its transition has indeed been smoother 
than those in Egypt, Yemen and Libya, 
where political volatility is higher. Thus, 
the media spotlight has moved to other 
countries. The little attention that Tunisia 
has received more recently has focused 
overwhelmingly on the emergence of the 
bogeyman of salafism.
 Far from ushering in the triumph 
of liberal and secular democratic forces 
across the region, the Arab uprisings have 
led to the electoral success of Islamist 
parties and movements.3 This is no longer 
as problematic as it was in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, when, for example, the 
Islamist party Front Islamique de Salut 
(FIS) was poised to take power in Algeria. 
Islamist movements have gone through a 
process of political moderation; many of 
them embrace the mechanisms of democ-
racy and support basic human rights.4 
However, the rise of Islamism in the wake 
of the Arab uprisings is not limited to what 
can be labeled mainstream Islamist par-
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ties deriving inspiration from the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Salafism, in its different 
strands, has surfaced as a potent political 
and social force, capturing a significant 
degree of attention and generating pro-
found fear. In the capital and other cities 
around Tunisia, public rallies by thousands 
of salafist activists and supporters have 
occurred over the past 18 months and still 
take place today, raising fears that they 
might be the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
fall of Ben Ali and the inability of the 
current government coalition to solve the 
country’s problems.
 The rise of salafism in Tunisia has 
been both surprising and problematic. Un-
like in Egypt or Yemen, there was very lit-
tle evidence that such a phenomenon even 
existed in Tunisia. Policy analysts, secular 
politicians and civil-society activists still 
claim today that it is an imported phenom-
enon, completely extraneous to Tunisian 
political, intellectual and social history. 
It is also problematic because its public 
presence in a democratizing environment 
can, according to some, negatively affect 
the way in which Tunisia will build its new 
political system and deal with the question 
of its identity and core values.5 Surprise 
and wariness characterize as well the reac-
tion of the international community, whose 
attitude towards salafism is extremely 
negative. It is perceived to pose a danger to 
liberal democracy and the stability of the 
international system.
 While not underestimating the phe-
nomenon, this examination of Tunisian 
salafism challenges the widely held as-
sumption about its foreign origin, high-
lights its internal divisions, and provides 
a more nuanced analysis of the complex 
relationship of its different strands with 
nascent democratic institutions. Scholarly 
research on Tunisian salafism requires 
time. It is a continuously developing politi-
cal phenomenon, but nuanced analyses 
are necessary in order to counter the more 
alarmist journalistic narratives. The objec-
tive is not to minimize the salafist presence 
on the public scene or condone the poli-
cies salafists want to see implemented, but 
simply to offer a more balanced examina-
tion of its place in the evolving Tunisian 
society.
 An unprecedented level of openness 
has characterized the new Tunisian politi-
cal context after Ben Ali’s fall, favoring 
the emergence of many new political and 
social actors. Despite their absence from 
the anti-regime protests, Islamist move-
ments have been able to take the greatest 
advantage of this situation. The previously 
outlawed Ennahda party led by Rachid 
Ghannouchi did extremely well in the 
October 2011 elections, winning 89 of 217 
seats in the Assembly and leading a three-
party coalition. Through its decision to 
play the democratic game and demonstrate 
a significant degree of political pragma-
tism, Ennahda has become a key actor in 
the current process of democratization. 
It even seemed for a time to monopolize 
the representation of political religiosity. 
However, the emergence of salafi actors 
offering a much more radically conserva-
tive interpretation of Islam in politics and 
social life has challenged such a monop-
oly, shocking both Tunisian society and 
foreign observers. 
 There is no doubt that many of the 
salafists’ views on how the institutions of 
the state should look and what kind of so-
cial, economic and foreign policies Tunisia 
should implement are both illiberal and 
largely unappealing, as it stands, to the ma-
jority of Tunisians, who feel that all of this 
is a Wahhabi deviation coming from Saudi 
Arabia. However, denying salafism its 
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 The permit to set up a party did not ar-
rive in 2011, in time for the October elec-
tions, because the transitional authorities 
did not trust the democratic commitment 
of any form of salafism. However, Jabhat 
al-Islah (Front of Reform) was eventually 
legalized on March 29, 2012, possibly 
because Ennahda, now in power and keen 
to bring salafists into the political system, 
vouched for it and for its commitment to 
democratic procedures. In May of the same 
year, the party was formally presented to 
the public. In attendance were a number of 
prominent religious figures and, crucially, 
Rachid Ghannouchi, president of Ennahda. 
The president of the first legal salafist party 
in Tunisia is Mohamed Khouja, who had 
been a prominent member of the TIF in the 
1980s. According to Rafik Aouni, leading 
member of the party, Jebhat al-Islah has 
been set up by those salafists “who had 
remained in Tunisia throughout the Ben 
Ali era, although contacts and channels 
of communication are still open with the 
ones who left; and in case they came back 
to Tunisia they would naturally join the 
party.”7
 The repressive measures that Ben Ali 
enacted following his accession to power 
targeted first and foremost the Islamists, 
whether salafists or others; and their 
disappearance from the public and politi-
cal scene was often applauded in West-
ern circles. The authoritarian stability of 
the Ben Ali regime, however, did not go 
unchallenged. Despite receiving very little 
attention in both academic and policy-
making circles, spaces of resistance and 
dissent sprang up, particularly during the 
2000s.8 Among these dissidents, we also 
have a small cohort of young men who 
embraced salafism in order to satisfy their 
spiritual needs, find a political framework 
through which they could express their 
domestic roots, as if the phenomenon were 
simply an aberration in Tunisian society 
and a mortal threat to the nascent demo-
cratic political system, does not permit 
one to understand its growth, its internal 
differences and how it relates to the other 
Tunisian social and political actors. 
INDIGENOUS OR IMPORTED?
 Far from being a recent foreign import, 
Tunisian salafism, in both its scientific and 
Jihadi versions, has its roots in the dissatis-
faction of some Islamists with the political 
thinking and strategies of its 1980s pre-
decessor, Ennahda or the Mouvement  de 
la Tendence Islamique (MTI), which had 
accepted the principle of democratic proce-
dures to govern society. Thus, a number 
of militants left the Islamist movement 
before it became a party in order to create 
the Tunisian Islamic Front (TIF) in 1986, 
although the creation of the TIF remained 
known only to its leaders until the security 
services discovered the founding docu-
ments in 1990 and began a very harsh re-
pressive campaign against it. Mohammad 
Ali Hurath, Abdallah al Haji, Mohammad 
Khoujia and Mongi al-Hachmi were its 
founding members. This group had a very 
limited influence, due to the repressive 
policies of the government. 
 A number of TIF militants left Tunisia 
for Pakistan or Bosnia, where they took 
part in the Afghani and Bosnian jihads; oth-
ers went into exile and others still remained 
in Tunisia, either in jail or marginalized in 
society. After the fall of the regime, a num-
ber of former members returned to Tunis 
with the intention to establish a political 
party that would run in the 2011 elections. 
At the same time, it became evident that 
a number of salafist militants had been 
freed from Tunisian jails and were ready to 
return to the public scene.6 
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and recruiting; its external image did not 
wholly correspond to reality. Rather than 
a country where democracy was being 
progressively installed, human rights 
increasingly respected and a market 
economy delivering high standards of 
living, Tunisia was a deeply authoritarian 
state with a predatory economy favoring 
politically connected elites while the wider 
population, 
particularly in 
working-class 
and disad-
vantaged 
rural regions, 
suffered 
from rapidly 
declining liv-
ing standards.9 In this context, the jihadist 
group Jund Assad ibn el-Furat was set up 
in 2006, although severely repressed soon 
afterward. According to Nadhif,
All the young people recruited into 
Jund Assad ibn Furat came under 
the control of the security services 
because of their assiduous frequenta-
tion of mosques and because of their 
physical appearance and attire. They 
were continuously brought to police 
stations for questioning and then 
released. They were suspects, always 
under pressure and socially margin-
alised in the sense that police attention 
meant unemployment.”10
 This continued pressure ensured 
deeper involvement with the jihadi salaf-
ist movement; greater repression turned 
into greater commitment to the cause. It is 
these young men, numbering a few thou-
sand — together with even more radical 
jihadi salafists who had actually taken up 
arms against Ben Ali in the mid-to-late 
2000s — who were freed from Tunisian 
resentment of an authoritarian and corrupt 
regime, and demonstrate solidarity with 
the great pan-Arab causes of the decade: 
Palestine and Iraq. 
 The impulse for the resurgence of 
indigenous salafism, however limited, 
came through “contamination” by Tuni-
sians who had engaged in foreign jihads 
of young men who had not gone abroad 
but embraced 
what salaf-
ism stood for. 
The Palestin-
ian Intifada, 
the war in 
Iraq, and the 
experience 
gathered in 
the European networks — both logistical 
and theoretical — have been formative 
for the younger generation of Tunisian 
salafists, especially the jihadists. Since the 
mid-2000s, Tunisians who had fought in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq 
have linked up with outside jihadists to 
strengthen a presence in Tunisia, where 
young men had begun to practice salafism 
in order to combat the secular regime of 
Ben Ali. 
 The architect of this attempt was 
Lassaad Sessi. In April 2006, Sessi and 
a small group of armed Jihadists crossed 
the border from Algeria into Tunisia and 
participated in a gunfight with Tunisian 
security forces. Having escaped the secu-
rity forces, Sessi managed to recruit a few 
young militants in Sousse, Tunis and Sidi 
Bouzid. What is surprising is that a recruit-
ing campaign could occur despite the sup-
posed insularity of Tunisia from extrem-
ism and the omnipresence of its security 
apparatus. 
 In 2006, Tunisia was already a rather 
fertile terrain for salafist propaganda 
Tunisia was a deeply authoritarian state 
with a predatory economy favoring 
politically connected elites while the wider 
population, particularly in working-class 
and disadvantaged rural regions, suffered 
from rapidly declining living standards.
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INSTITUTIONS V. STREET POLITICS
 The definition of salafism is still a sub-
ject of debate among scholars. If we follow 
the classical interpretation in the modern 
era, it dates back to the late nineteenth 
century, with the emergence in the Islamic 
world of Islamic Reformism (islah). The 
term salafism derives from the Arabic 
salafiyyun, “the ancestors,” the first three 
generations of Muslims, deemed to be the 
most pious believers. Salafiyya theorized a 
return to original Islam through the elimi-
nation of those elements that, throughout 
history, have been introduced from the out-
side and inevitably changed the essence of 
its origins. The use of the term salafism in 
reference to current Islamic radical move-
ments is relatively new and has partially 
lost the meaning it had initially assumed 
during the era of Islamic reformism. Refer-
ring today to organizations and groups 
characterized by a purist interpretation of 
Islam as salafism is a kind of after-the-fact 
definition of a term that originally had a 
specific meaning. 
 Such a theoretical premise is funda-
mental to any discussion of salafism today, 
regardless of the context. Wiktorowicz 
identifies three forms of salafism: pur-
ist, political and jihadist.12 Purist salafists 
are primarily focused on maintaining the 
purity of Islam, in compliance with the 
requirements of the Quran and the Sunna 
and with what was predetermined by the 
consensus (ijma) of the companions (an-
sar) of Muhammad. The strategy of action 
favored by purist salafism is based on two 
main pillars: propaganda (dawa) and edu-
cation (tarbiyya). These tools are preferred 
to political activism, as purists assume Is-
lamization from below and do not interfere 
with the legal and institutional frameworks 
in which governments operate. This is 
justified by pragmatic opportunism. They 
jails in the immediate aftermath of the 
revolution and became the catalysts for 
increased salafist recruiting and activism. 
The vast majority of them ended up in the 
broader salafist tendency, with a significant 
number joining Ansar al-Sharia, which was 
set up in April 2011 under the leadership of 
Abu Ayyad al-Tunisi, whose real name is 
Sayf Allah Umar bin Hussein. Abu Ayyad, 
with Tarek al-Maaroufi, had founded a 
Tunisian group of jihadis in Afghanistan in 
2000. After having attempted terrorism in 
Europe, most of them were arrested. Abu 
Ayyad was captured in Turkey and deport-
ed to Tunisia on charges of international 
terrorism in 2003.11 Tarek al-Maaroufi 
returned to Tunis after the revolution but 
distanced himself from jihadi activism. 
 Abu Ayyad, in prison in Tunisia, 
fraternized with the young local men who 
were the targets of Ben Ali’s repression 
for their radical Islamist views. It is the 
linkage between international jihadism 
and local religious radicalism that shapes 
Tunisian salafism. The international fac-
tor is certainly important and to an ex-
tent superficially justifies those who see 
Tunisian salafism as an import. However, 
it should be highlighted that the ones who 
are involved, whether returning exiles or 
local activists, are all Tunisians reacting to 
Tunisian conditions. This includes the in-
ternational jihadis who had left because of 
repression from the Ben Ali regime, which 
had never permitted any sort of Islamist 
politics. Ansar al-Sharia represents today 
the most important organized salafist-jihadi 
group in the country.
 Thus, while there are certainly links 
with events and groups outside of Tunisia, 
the salafist phenomenon cannot be labeled 
as “foreign.” It has characterized, although 
very marginally, Tunisian society since the 
beginning of the 1980s at least. 
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model to follow in pursuit of their goals. 
Amghar,14 Hegghammer, Zelin15 and 
Bonnefoy16 are other scholars who have 
attempted to classify salafism through 
similar categories, at times expanding on 
them to refine the categorization. Their 
work should be commended for setting 
out quite clearly the differences that exist 
within the salafist camp. These categoriza-
tions are helpful in the Tunisian case; there 
are profound 
divisions 
and distinc-
tions among 
the differ-
ent salafist 
groups active 
in the coun-
try. Of partic-
ular interest 
is the relationship such groups have with 
the nascent democratic institutions and the 
other political and social actors that have 
bought into and support the construction of 
a democratic Tunisia, including Ennahda.
 Understanding such relationships is 
vital for three reasons. First, sectors of 
salafism can gradually be brought around 
to accept the mechanisms of democracy 
and the legitimacy of the state’s institu-
tions, going through a process of modera-
tion similar to the one that Ennahda, for 
instance, has experienced. This process 
of institutionalization could paradoxically 
strengthen the democratic process in so far 
as the inclusion of salafists in the political 
system could indicate that there is “room 
for everyone” at the table, as long as some 
key principles of democracy are respected. 
Giving legal and institutional voice to the 
small sectors of the population buying into 
the salafist political project would symbol-
ize the success of Tunisian democracy.
 Second, the absence of economic 
fear that if any political action, particularly 
violence, threatens the very existence of 
the state, repression will ensue.
 In this perspective, political move-
ments and jihadists are criticized because 
their actions are counterproductive and 
actually lead to the repression of Islamist 
activism. The strategy that purist salaf-
ism follows results in a kind of isolation-
ism or retreat from political and social 
institutions. 
This finds 
its source of 
legitimacy 
in the first 
phase of 
Muhammad’s 
preaching 
(the so-called 
Meccan pe-
riod), when the hostile environment urged 
the Prophet to prefer forms of “horizontal” 
propaganda rather than political action. On 
the contrary, the choice of political activ-
ism is the one political salafism adopts in 
response to the frustration over purists’ 
persistence in remaining outside the politi-
cal arena. Therefore, political salafism acts 
directly within the political system to influ-
ence its choices. Its strategy is motivated 
by the need to deal directly with current af-
fairs; and it accuses purist isolationism of 
misinterpreting the current reality, making 
Islam irrelevant for Muslims. 
 Finally, jihadist salafism is a form of 
violent opposition to “unjust rule,” aimed 
at establishing an Islamic state. Unlike 
political salafism, whose formation took 
place in Islamic universities based on the 
classic texts of salafism, “[...] jihadists 
have received their political training on the 
battlefields.”13 The example of the armed 
struggle against the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in the 1980s represents the 
The rather large Islamist vote that is 
today largely channeled to Ennahda 
could begin to question the pace of 
the reform process and embrace more 
radical forms of political engagement, 
including the use of violence. 
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growth, the continuation of profound 
inequities, and the perceived increasing 
distance between ordinary citizens and 
the new political system, combined with 
the inability of the state to cope with the 
avalanche of socioeconomic demands from 
civil society, would certainly embolden 
those salafist activists who reject the 
democratic game, favor street politics and 
are ultimately anti-government. In such 
a scenario, the rather large Islamist vote 
that is today largely channeled to Ennahda 
could begin to question the pace of the 
reform process and embrace more radical 
forms of political engagement, including 
the use of violence. Criticism of Ennahda 
is emerging, even from the party’s youth 
wing, which recently criticized the leader-
ship for its hesitancy in tackling economic 
and social problems.
 Finally, accounting for salafist activ-
ism in all of its forms is an essential part 
of the story of anti-Islamist mobilization 
in Tunisia, in so far as the fear factor is 
stimulating the secularists into embracing 
the newfound freedoms and using them 
to advance their own agenda.17 This is 
particularly important. The mobilization of 
leftists and liberals can ensure that politi-
cal representation is given to all sectors of 
Tunisian society. Apathy would benefit Is-
lamism, which has traditionally been better 
at turning people out, both at the polls and 
in the streets. The regressive social mea-
sures that salafism stands for in the eyes 
of secular Tunisians paradoxically ensure 
that there will be no complacency, further 
strengthening democratic politics.
INSTITUTIONALIZED SALAFISM
 As mentioned earlier, the older genera-
tion of salafists embodied by people like 
Mohammed Khouja, one of the founding 
members of TIF in the late 1980s, intended 
to set up a salafist political party imme-
diately after the revolution. Converted 
to institutional politics after having been 
involved in jihadi salafism, Khouja repre-
sents an older generation that advocates 
the Islamization of the state through the 
“reformist salafism method.”18 In short, 
they do institutional politics. This current 
is more pragmatic and realistic than the 
jihadists and is uncomfortable with the 
idea of retreating into isolationism. Thus, 
one of the strategies of action of reform-
ist salafism is to participate actively in 
the political and institutional processes of 
the state, even under conditions in which 
sharia is not applied. In fact, they consider 
the choice of participation as the most 
rational approach to changing society and 
achieving the application of sharia,19 but 
the means are in accordance with demo-
cratic mechanisms. 
 Khouja and other former members of 
TIF reunited with the clear intention of 
establishing a political party, and in March 
2012 the national authorities finally legal-
ized Jabhat al-Islah, the first official salafi 
party in Tunisia. The party’s name, linked 
to reformism, and its request to participate 
in the 2013 elections are two elements that 
help to better locate the Front squarely 
within the scientific reformist salafi camp. 
Given its willingness to participate in 
the political process, Jabhat al-Islah has 
disclosed its own political program identi-
fying the general objectives of the party, as 
well as specific proposals for the political, 
economic, social and cultural fields.20
 The general objectives of the party 
are the creation of an Islamic state and the 
application of Islamic law in all spheres of 
life. Although there are references to respect 
for pluralism and for the principle of alter-
nance (the alternating of power), it speci-
fies that political life should be conducted 
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are quite widely shared across the politi-
cal spectrum. Palestinian Hamas leaders 
Ismail Haniyeh and Khaled Mishal were 
received by politicians from all political 
parties and all ideological persuasions 
when they visited Tunis. Violence to 
achieve political objectives is explicitly 
rejected. It is specified in its manifesto 
that the methods through which political 
affairs should be conducted are demonstra-
tions, sit-ins, participation in elections and 
propaganda through traditional media.  
 In addition to the Front of Reform, 
another party that professes itself to be 
salafist and 
has the ulti-
mate goal of 
establishing 
Islamic rule 
is al-Rahma 
(Mercy), 
which was 
legalized on 
July 31, 2012. The party is led by Sayd 
al-Jaziri, a salafi preacher who has lived in 
Canada. After being sentenced in absentia 
under the Ben Ali regime for his member-
ship in Ennahda, al-Jaziri was no longer 
able to return to Tunisia until the fall of 
the regime. During his years in Canada, 
he repeatedly argued for the need to adopt 
sharia and distinguished himself as one of 
the spiritual leaders of the Islamic commu-
nity. There is a third salafist party, al-Asala 
(Authenticity), led by Mouldi Mujahid and 
tied to the eponymous party in Egypt. 
 These parties do not enjoy much 
popularity, but what is more important is 
the signal that they send in accepting the 
institutional parameters. In particular, the 
ruling Ennahda party has been working 
towards the inclusion of salafists into the 
political game since they emerged on the 
scene because Ennahda itself has salafist 
within the limits imposed by sharia. This 
suggests that Islam has pre-eminence in the 
political project of the party at the expense 
of the pluralism that liberalism advances. 
In some ways, the Front is an anti-system 
party. It does not buy into the idea that 
all voices are legitimate and that the state 
should protect them. In fact, the state should 
enforce only what religion has determined 
to be right. For instance, at the first party 
congress, held on July 8, 2012, General-
Secretary Muhammad Khouja reaffirmed 
that sharia is the only way to rule.21  
 In economics, it proposes to ban inter-
est rates and 
to restore the 
waqf system, 
giving promi-
nence to an 
“Islamic wel-
fare state.” In 
the cultural 
section of its 
manifesto, the party emphasizes the impor-
tance of ijtihad (argumentation) as a means 
to reform Islam and recognizes Western 
innovations in technology and science. In 
terms of social policies, the party criticized 
the choice not to include a reference to 
Islamic law in the new constitution and 
called for the re-introduction of polygamy 
and the abolition of the egalitarian Code 
of Personal Status, adopted by Bourguiba 
in 1956.22 This last point is particularly 
controversial. It would question the social 
advances of Tunisian women and impose 
the regressive views that secular civil 
society and political parties have strongly 
mobilized against. 
 In foreign policy, the Front reaffirms 
the rejection of any normalization with 
Israel and makes explicit reference to the 
Palestinian cause. However, these are 
not particularly contentious issues; they 
Ennahda has been able to integrate itself 
into the institutional system, especially 
because it has given up the objective of 
creating an Islamic state and applying 
sharia. 
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roots. Before its reintegration into Tunisian 
political life, Ennahda could have been cat-
egorized for a time as a salafist movement, 
as its rhetoric and social and political 
activities reflect the desire to return to the 
original form of Islam. However, it should 
be emphasized that from the outset, Ghan-
nouchi kept referring to the compatibility 
between democracy and Islam, indicating 
a degree of ideological flexibility that cur-
rent salafists do not yet possess.23 Ennahda 
was a salafi movement; it stood in direct 
continuity with Islamic reformers, stand-
ing between a purist salafism and a more 
political one, which determined whether 
it could operate in the Tunisian context. 
Ghannouchi defines himself a salafi, but 
only “to the extent that salafism is under-
stood as a return to the noble values  of 
Islam based on Quran and Sunna.”24 
 Nevertheless, the ongoing transforma-
tion of his party makes Ennahda an expres-
sion of political Islam that has distanced 
itself markedly from the current salafi gal-
axy. It has been able to integrate itself into 
the institutional system, especially because 
it has given up the objective of creating 
an Islamic state and applying sharia. The 
attempt to integrate current salafists is 
an important objective of Ennahda for a 
number of reasons. First, there is a degree 
of understanding of the radical positions 
of the salafists. Many Ennahda members 
used to hold similar views in the past and 
have come around to different methods 
and policies only rather recently. Second, 
the inclusion of salafists in the political 
game might benefit Ennahda electorally, 
given that the radicalism of salafists would 
be neutered; having joined the political 
system, salafists would no longer seem so 
radical. Finally, Ennahda can use salafists 
to provide a more moderate image of itself, 
arguing that it is defending democracy 
and human rights by acting as a rampart 
against salafism.
 The problem with salafists who have 
joined the institutional game is that they 
tend to represent an older generation 
with little following. Therefore, a much 
younger and larger cohort of salafists, who 
grew up in the radicalized environment of 
the 2000s, remains outside institutional 
politics and prefers to rely on bottom-up 
activism and street politics. It is these 
movements that present a real challenge to 
the nascent political order and to Ennahda, 
as does Hizbu-t-Tahrir, a transnational 
Islamist movement with a very distinct 
ideological and political agenda that at-
tempts to go beyond the perceived ideolog-
ical duopoly of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Islamism and salafism.25 
ANSAR AL-SHARIA
 Ansar al-Sharia was set up in April 
2011 under the leadership of Abu Ayyad 
al-Tunisi, a jihadist who fought in Afghan-
istan during the battle of Tora Bora and in 
2003 was deported to Tunisia on charges 
of international terrorism.26 Once freed, in 
the aftermath of the revolution, Abu Ayyad 
began organizing salafist activism, thanks 
to the contacts and prestige that prison 
gave him. In addition, the group can count 
on a prominent spiritual leader, Shaykh 
Khatib al-Idrissi, who had condoned the 
use of violence against the Ben Ali regime, 
was in prison for two years and enjoys 
significant credibility. A year after its 
creation, the movement seems to be grow-
ing, as demonstrated by the mass rally in 
Qayrawan to celebrate its first anniversary, 
attended by thousands of people.
 Despite a leadership profile that sug-
gests that Ansar al-Sharia is a revolution-
ary or jihadist movement, armed violence 
against the post-Ben Ali order has not oc-
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Those who eliminate jihad from the 
tools with which the message of Islam 
should be propagated are not salaf-
ist because they eliminate a pillar 
of Islam,...and as Muslims we have 
to accept Islam in its entirety.... The 
Jihadi salafist is different from other 
Muslims because he is coherent with 
the whole of the revelation and refuses 
to dilute it in order to become a moder-
ate simply to appease the government 
or the unbelievers....Our instrument is 
preaching... the spreading and teach-
ing of Islam in a peaceful manner. We 
do not wish to make war on anybody 
because the term jihad does not exclu-
sively mean fighting, but it is also the 
struggle to propagate the message of 
Islam through the dawa, through par-
ticipation in the solution of problems, 
although in the confines of sharia law.28
 Calling for jihad in the form of fight-
ing is not yet an option for the current 
generation of salafists outside of institu-
tional politics. It is well known that the 
group considers the current government 
to be hostile to salafism, but the govern-
ment cannot be considered an enemy to be 
fought through an armed struggle. It has 
yet to prevent the teaching and the dawa 
of the salafist groups. Within Tunisia, the 
movement considers society its privileged 
field of action; its purpose is to Islamize 
the country through social activism. In 
this context, the continuing commitment 
of Ansar al-Sharia to the delivery of social 
services is paradigmatic. Distributing es-
sential goods and food to the rural poor or 
bringing aid to people affected by a wave 
of bad weather in January-February 2012 
are only two examples of what the group 
does. On the occasion of the storms in the 
northwest of the country, Ansar al-Sharia 
organized aid caravans in the regions of 
curred. The movement prefers to conduct 
what can be termed street politics in order 
to achieve its political and social objec-
tives inside Tunisia. This choice is not 
only ideological, but also pragmatic. Ansar 
al-Sharia has a loose official structure, with 
Abu Ayyad at the top as the charismatic 
leader, Sami Assyd charged with organi-
zational matters and logistics, and Hassen 
Ben Brik as dawa officer.27 It follows that 
at the moment Ansar al-Sharia functions 
more as a label that many different local 
groups operating across the country have 
chosen. In this context, the role of local 
sheikhs, usually charismatic figures with 
great preaching skills, is fundamental to 
the success of the group. 
 In any case, it is groups referring 
broadly to Ansar al-Sharia that openly 
challenge the democratic direction of the 
country. Ideologically, they reject democ-
racy as extraneous to the teaching and the 
“living” of Islam and therefore concentrate 
their effort on the dawa, attempting to ex-
ercise control over society and the behav-
ior of individuals in order to reinforce so-
cial mores, the “straight path” of Islam in 
its strictest interpretation. First, the group 
organized “occupy mosques” campaigns to 
chase out imams who were accused of hav-
ing been too loyal to the regime. Second, 
it called attention to the plight of Tunisian 
prisoners in Iraqi jails. The group orga-
nized advocacy campaigns and lobbied the 
government to intervene on their behalf. 
Family members of the prisoners set up an 
association to highlight the issue. Finally, 
it organized campaigns to defend religious 
symbols, to make blasphemy a criminal 
offense, to introduce gender segregation in 
public spaces, and to encourage charitable 
activities. Sheikh Khatib Idriss argues as 
follows:
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Janduba and Kasserine, more specifically 
in the city of Haydrah.29 This activity falls 
within the realm of dawa and is in direct 
contrast to the government’s poor efforts. 
The movement therefore attempts to re-
place state actors, demonstrating its ability 
to generate support for its activities and, 
at the same time, to highlight the state’s 
deficiencies. 
 Moreover, the commitment to social 
assistance is not limited to such one-off 
catastrophes. The distribution of food 
and essential goods extends to the entire 
national territory and is targeted at poor 
families in remote areas of the country, as 
well as in the suburbs of the capital. On the 
Ansar al-Sharia Facebook page, one of the 
group’s most important propaganda tools, 
there are dozens of photographs and press 
releases highlighting this kind of social 
commitment.30 Unlike in other countries of 
the region, Tunisian Islamist movements 
have never before been able to operate in 
the social context and are therefore using 
this newfound freedom to invest resources 
there. This possibility for social action 
partly explains why a leadership formed 
through violent jihadism has decided not to 
use violence against a regime they consid-
er insufficiently Islamic — and therefore 
unjust. Using violence might cause the 
movement to be repressed or banned. 
 The hope of Ansar al-Sharia is that the 
shortcomings of the new political system 
will be such that ordinary Tunisians will 
fall increasingly into the salafist ranks 
and support a much more radical political 
project. For its part, the government and 
Ennahda, in particular, are keen to avoid 
an open confrontation with Ansar al-Shar-
ia, although the attack on the U.S. embassy 
in September 2012 severely tested the 
ruling majority’s tolerance. Ennahda, in 
particular, does not want to ban the move-
ment; they argue that this would simply 
drive them underground and turn them into 
victims. But further high-profile incidents 
undermining the image of Tunisia abroad 
might force the party’s hand. Thus, despite 
a number of episodes bordering on rioting 
that occurred over the past few months, 
the group remains broadly nonviolent, 
although anti-government.31
 The jihadi origin and nature of the 
group is demonstrated on the international 
stage, as it openly embraces jihadism 
and violent struggle. Abu Ayyad himself 
stated that one of the ultimate goals of the 
movement is to wage jihad abroad, Tunisia 
being only a “land of prayer.” Through 
several press releases issued by al-Qa-
yrawan Media Foundation’s blog, Abu 
Ayyad praised Osama bin Laden at the 
time of his death, calling him a shahid and 
referring to the former head of al-Qaeda as 
“our leader.”32 More than once the leader 
of Ansar al-Sharia has justified the actions 
of global jihadists abroad, and specific epi-
sodes show its proximity to jihad beyond 
Tunisian borders. In November 2011, for 
example, the movement’s Facebook profile 
posted photos of the body of Tunisian 
jihadist Yosri al-Triqi, sentenced to death 
in Iraq for attacks against a Shiite mosque 
in 2006. He was also glorified in a post 
entitled “Farewell to our martyred broth-
ers.”33 In May 2012, dozens of militants 
occupied the waiting room of the interna-
tional airport of Tunis-Carthage to protest 
the authorities’ decision to deny entry to 
the country to Umar al-Hadushi, a member 
of the Moroccan jihadist group linked to 
the 2003 Casablanca bombing.34 
 Finally, jihadists from Tunisia were 
arrested in Syria, which has become one of 
the causes of global jihadism. According 
to some Tunisian sources, salafi-controlled 
mosques in Tunisia engage in propaganda 
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to provide the legal system with juridical 
rules that can serve as tools for the applica-
tion of Islamic law. However, during the 
month of Ramadan in 2012, al-Almi was 
accused of inciting violence, inviting those 
who do not practice ritual fasting not to ap-
pear in public, in order “not to provoke the 
ire of salafists,” and declaring that bars and 
restaurants should not serve food or drink 
during fasting hours.37 At a meeting in Tu-
nis on sharia in March 2012, the associa-
tion’s leader declared that he “would fight 
against everything that is against sharia.”38 
Unlike Ansar al-Sharia, the Centrist Asso-
ciation for Awareness and Reform oper-
ates exclusively in the Tunisian context. 
What the two movements have in common 
is their unwillingness to participate di-
rectly in the political process, their shared 
emphasis on the dawa aimed at creating an 
Islamic state, and their preferred method of 
action: demonstrations. 
CONCLUSION 
 A number of important points emerge 
from the analysis of Tunisian salafism 
that are crucial to future political develop-
ments in the country. First, it should be 
underscored that Tunisian salafism is not 
a foreign import, but represents the politi-
cal demands of a sector of the population 
that has found in the liberal post-Ben Ali 
atmosphere an opportunity to organize 
openly and proselytize for a social project 
that stands in sharp contrast to the direc-
tion taken so far. Salafists are very much 
the product of Ben Ali’s authoritarian, 
secular and mafia-style political economy. 
Its legacy is an impoverished country in 
which a part of the population, however 
small, has been radicalized to the extent of 
embracing salafism. Although the views 
and policies that Tunisian salafism stands 
for are not appealing to the majority of 
activities aimed at sending jihadists to 
Syria to fight the regime.35 Ansar al-Sharia 
has repeatedly fomented efforts against the 
regime, including hosting on its Facebook 
page several posts from the Syrian jihad-
ist group Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahlal-Sham 
(Front of the Victory for the People of 
Greater Syria), an organization that has 
claimed responsibility for most of the 2012 
terrorist attacks in Damascus and Aleppo. 
It appears that Ansar al-Sharia, when refer-
ring to issues outside of Tunisia, acquires 
an attitude of revolutionary salafism, sym-
pathizing with the cause of global jihad.
 In the current scenario, the dual nature 
of Ansar al-Sharia provides an emerg-
ing alternative to Ennahda, with which 
it competes for support in the country. 
Ghannouchi’s party is, in fact, accused of 
having joined the institutional system and 
betraying the cause of Islamization, as its 
refusal to introduce references to sharia in 
the new constitution amply demonstrates, 
according to salafists. Finally, it should be 
underlined that, although Ansar al-Sharia 
is the most influential and visible anti-gov-
ernment force, there are other movements 
that intend to establish an Islamic state but 
have not formed political parties. There 
is, for instance, al-Jamiyya al-Wasatiyya 
li-l-Tawiyyawa-l-Islah (Centrist Associa-
tion for Awareness and Reform), created in 
November 2011. The association does not 
participate in political life in Tunisia, but it 
is interested in having a role in public life, 
devoting itself to tarbiyya. Adel al-Almi, 
its leader and founder, planned to create a 
real religious police force, to be deployed 
in the streets in order to enforce Islamic 
law. The basic aim of the association is to 
enforce sharia on the basis that Tunisia is a 
Muslim country.36 
 The movement’s strategy also involves 
influencing the legislative process in order 
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the population, their right to express them 
has to be protected. This leads to a second 
challenge: the internal divisions that oper-
ating in a liberal environment has created. 
 While an older generation of salaf-
ists has come back to the country to set 
up political parties that accept democratic 
mechanisms that did not originate in Is-
lamic law, a younger cohort has chosen 
to remain outside the political system, 
operating through preaching and social 
activism and maintaining links with the 
global jihadi movement. This suggests that 
the varied nature of Tunisian salafism is 
an indicator of how it is going to develop 
in the future. The success of the Tunisian 
transition, particularly in its economic and 
social dimensions, is likely to pre-empt the 
further growth of the salafist phenomenon, 
in so far as it feeds on the deficiencies 
of nascent institutions and on worsening 
living conditions. Conversely, the failure 
to address convincingly the country’s 
profound socioeconomic challenges is 
likely to embolden those salafists who 
have remained outside the political system 
and offer a radical alternative to the liberal 
democracy that is being built.  
 Paradoxically, the party that has the 
most to gain or lose, depending on how 
the transition will develop, is Ennahda. 
The party’s decision to participate in the 
elections and to recognize the Tunisian 
institutional system was expected, given 
its ideological commitment to democratic 
procedures. The subsequent formation of 
a transitional coalition government with 
two leftist parties was also to be expected, 
given their previous history of cooperation 
while in exile.  Finally, the condemnation 
of the violent salafi demonstrations on 
more than one occasion and the choice not 
to make sharia a source of legislation in 
the new constitution39 were also expected, 
given the conflict this might have gener-
ated. All of this alienated a number of 
Islamists, including some within the party 
itself. It is, therefore, not a surprise that the 
emergence and proliferation of salafi move-
ments represent a significant challenge.
 These manifestations of salafi Islam-
ism reveal that Ennahda is not the only 
catalyst of consensus based on Islam. The 
party must deal with other actors who 
have their sources of legitimacy in Islamic 
principles and tend to question the very le-
gitimacy of Ennahda on the basis of these 
values. Ennahda has attempted to defuse 
the salafists’ challenge by sponsoring their 
entrance into the institutional system. 
They have been partially successful, but 
they have so far been unable to bring the 
more radical and popular groups into the 
institutional game, leaving themselves 
exposed in case of a failure to deliver on 
the promise of socioeconomic renewal.40 In 
this framework, the political and reform-
ist salafi parties that have been permitted 
to compete in the 2013 elections will have 
to choose whether to represent the anti-
government and social salafi movements 
and obtain their consensus, or to ally with 
Ennahda in an attempt to further isolate the 
jihadist fringes.
 The final point has to do with the chal-
lenge that salafi movements present for 
Tunisian society as a whole, and in particu-
lar for secular sectors, which refer to them 
as a cancer that might threaten the process 
of democratization. Recent events, includ-
ing demonstrations in support of sharia as 
a source of legislation, and attacks on some 
symbols of the supposed deviance of the 
country, have brought this phenomenon 
to the forefront of the political debate, 
both inside and outside Tunisia. While the 
significance of such events should not be 
underestimated, it should also be recog-
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nized that they have been paradoxically 
useful for strengthening the democratic and 
liberal resolve of those who are opposed 
to the salafist vision of society. Large parts 
of secular society were accustomed to 
demanding and obtaining protection from 
Ben Ali, supposedly a defender of secular 
modernization, against what they saw as 
religious bigotry directed against them and 
their lifestyles.41 Today, they are having 
to take responsibility for organizing and 
promoting their future in Tunisia against 
regressive ideologies. Counterdemonstra-
tions, shows of support for those victimized 
by salafists, and petitions against regres-
sive legislation demonstrate the vitality 
of Tunisian society and its attachments to 
the newfound freedoms that reinforce the 
validity of the democratic path. 
 Tunisian salafism is unlikely to derail 
the Tunisian transition, but closer attention 
should be paid to the phenomenon. It plays 
a significant role at the social level and 
could become a crucial political force in 
the future, if the governing coalition after 
the 2013 elections is unable to address the 
causes of discontent that led to the removal 
of Ben Ali.  
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